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The new United Nations peace envoy to S
The new UN-Arab League envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, presents an opportunity to reverse the Muslim Brotherhood's domination of the Syrian National Council. Photograph: Patrick Kovarik/AFP/Getty
The new UN-Arab League envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, presents an opportunity to reverse the Muslim Brotherhood's domination of the Syrian National Council. Photograph: Patrick Kovarik/AFP/Getty

Syrians are torn between a despotic regime and a stagnant opposition

This article is more than 11 years old
The Muslim Brotherhood's perceived monopoly over the Syrian National Council has created an opposition stalemate

A year ago this week, the Syrian National Council was formed in Istanbul by a coalition of political forces and figures that presented themselves as society's representatives. In the absence of a mechanism to determine the power base of each political force, the Muslim Brotherhood came to dominate the council, benefiting from its relations with Islamist-leaning Turkey.

The Brotherhood's perceived monopoly over the council has led to a chronic political stalemate within the opposition and will most likely undermine an orderly transition if the situation persists. But the appointment of Algerian veteran diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi as the new UN-Arab League envoy to Syria, along with the recent defections of high-level technocrats, presents a new opportunity to reverse the group's domination.

Brahimi is unlikely to succeed where his predecessor Kofi Annan failed in terms of ending the violence, but he can secure a political settlement and mediate a representative, inclusive political body that will help to avert chaos in the wake of the regime's downfall.

It is difficult to precisely gauge the Brotherhood's power base inside Syria, as the organisation has been banned since 1963. But past experience, when the Brotherhood was part of the country's political system for more than a decade, and well-established social dynamics offer useful insights.

Moulhem Droubi, a senior member of the Brotherhood, has said the organisation represents 25% of the Syrian population. That is certainly disputable. In the 1949 parliamentary election, the movement won around 2.5% of the vote and in subsequent elections never rose above 6%.

At the time, the Brotherhood was viewed largely as a moderate organisation that preached more about socialism than religion, though it later started to alienate minorities. In 1950, it successfully campaigned to amend the constitution to make Islam the religion of the state and the president.

With the ascension of the Ba'ath party and its totalitarian rule in the 60s, the Brotherhood turned violent, splintered and formed militias that would later target civilians and military officers along sectarian lines in the 70s and 80s. Its power base has since dwindled significantly after four decades of systematic cleansing by the Ba'athist regime.

Activists from various parts of Syria have told me that, prior to the uprising last year, the country had almost zero Brotherhood presence. The organisation's presence then started to return in some areas, particularly in Homs, Hama and Idlib.

Salama Kayla, a Christian Palestinian-Syrian who was recently deported by the regime for his role in the uprising, said he had visited several protest spots, including in Homs and Hama, in the early months of the uprising.

He said there were "negligible groups" of Brotherhood members with the protests in few areas. He said that activists in Hama complained that a small Brotherhood-affiliated group was pushing for "violent conflict". It was surprising, he said, that the Brotherhood had such a small presence in a city widely considered as its stronghold.

"I am a middle-class Halabi [from Aleppo] and everyone I knew hated them," one activist told me. "The only time I ever met an MB member is during an embassy protest outside Syria. They seem to be more popular among exiles."

A senior member of the SNC who is close to the Brotherhood told me the organisation tends to believe that any person who receives aid through the group is expected to support it electorally in the future.

Even if the Brotherhood succeeds in establishing a palpable presence, its influence is likely to be limited to certain areas. At least seven out of 14 provinces will be outside the Brotherhood's sphere of influence for the foreseeable future: Hasaka, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Deraa (tribal and Kurdish areas that make up over 30% of the population, loyal to their local leaders), Suweida (the Druze stronghold, nearly 2% of the population) and the coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartus (where Alawites, Ismailis and other minorities are based and make up nearly 8.5% of the population).

Demographically, non-Sunnis form 30% of the population and Sunni Kurds make up 9%. These bases of ethnic and religious minorities, plus the tribes – altogether making up at least 70% of the population – had been outside the group's influence in the past and will remain so in the future.

When the Brotherhood was part of the political system, the business community in both Aleppo and Damascus allied itself with the People's party, a nationalist non-Islamist party, and then to the Ba'ath party. Politically, the business community today is also more likely to ally itself with non-Islamist groups.

Also, in both of these significant cities, the business community is socially tied with a local pragmatic clergy that adheres to a classical Sunni religious school similar to that of al-Azhar in Egypt.

The Brotherhood realises the limits of its power and seeks to establish levers of influence during the uprising and in the transition period. According to different accounts, the Brotherhood is using its control over the two key offices within the SNC, the aid and military offices, to establish leverage in certain areas and among the Free Syrian Army.

The group has formed its own brigades under the so-called Body of Civilians Protection, naming some of the brigades after the Brotherhood's historical leaders. According to one informed source, the group has additionally about 13 brigades operating in Hama, known as Abulfidaa brigades.

Meanwhile, the country appears set for a war that will continue until the regime falls. Significant segments of society in Syria are torn between a despotic regime that is committing atrocities on a daily basis and a stagnant political opposition that has so far failed to present a viable alternative and is dominated by a group they view suspiciously. That is a torn majority, not a silent majority.

More on this story

More on this story

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  • Syrian opposition unity talks marred by boycott threat

  • US and Turkey meet to discuss Syrian chemical weapons

  • Cameron echoes Obama's warning to Syria over chemical weapons

  • Syrian rebels fight on for Aleppo despite local wariness

  • Syrian shelling and torture claims mar Eid

  • Mika Yamamoto: Japanese journalist killed in Syria

  • Syria crisis: Obama and Cameron issue chemical weapons warning - Thursday 23 August 2012

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